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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-DISCOVERY OF AGENCY'S DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS-In re Lecy, 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981).
To what extent may a party seeking review of an administrative
agency decision probe the mental processes of an administrative deci-
sionmaker? l In In re Lecy2 the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the
1. This question has plagued courts since Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1
(1938) (Morgan If). In Morgan I the Court stated that it was not its function "to probe the
mental processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions if he gave the hearing which
the law required." d. at 18.
In United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV), the market agencies
involved in a rate dispute with the Department of Agriculture sought to depose the secre-
tary of that department. The Court, relying in part on Morgan II, rejected the attempt:
The Secretary thereupon appeared in person at the trial. He was questioned at
length regarding the process by which he reached the conclusions of his order,
including the manner and extent of his study of the record and his consultation
with subordinates. His testimony shows that he dealt with the enormous record
in a manner not unlike the practice of judges in similar situations, and that he
held various conferences with the examiner who heard the evidence. Much was
made of his disregard of a memorandum from one of his officials who, on read-
ing the proposed order, urged considerations favorable to the market agencies.
But the short of the business is that the Secretary should never have been sub-
jected to this examination. The proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality
resembling that of a judicial proceeding." Such an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held in this
very litigation that "it was not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the Secretary." Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scru-
tiny, so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. It
will bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a different
development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they are
to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate inde-
pendence of each should be respected by the other.
Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a corporation
brought an action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain from the
Adminstrator of the Environmental Protection Agency two summaries of evidence devel-
oped at a hearing. Id. at 64. The court stated, "To probe summaries of record evidence
would be the same as probing the decision-making process itself." Id. at 68. Thus, evi-
dence of the agency's deliberative process is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Id. at
71.
In Public Util. Comm'n v. District Court, 163 Colo. 462, 431 P.2d 773 (1967), the
state public utilities commission granted a delivery service company extensions in its field
of authorized operation. Id. at 464, 431 P.2d 774-75. Protestants sought to make the
commissioners answer their requests for admissions. Id. The court held that unless the
commissioners acted illegally, were biased, or acted in bad faith in their decision, it is
improper to direct commissioners to answer requests for admissions. Id. at 469, 431 P.2d
at 777; see also Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974) (Comptroller of Currency's decision which rendered find-
ings of fact concomitantly with decision to grant charter to new national bank barred
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scope and availability of such discovery. 3
reviewing court from requiring agency officials to explain their actions); Libis v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 33 Ohio App. 2d 94, 292 N.E.2d 642 (1972) (administrative officer sitting
in quasi-judicial capacity cannot be examined as to mental processes in arriving at deci-
sion). See generally Nathanson, Probbng The Mind of the Admhirstrator Hean'ng Variations and
Standards ofjudicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975); 50 WASH. L. REV. 739 (1975).
2. 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981).
3. Id. at 900; see bnfra notes 19-41 and accompanying text. The court also reaffirmed
the substantial evidence test as the proper scope of review, 304 N.W.2d at 898; see MINN.
STAT. § 14.69(e) (1982), and restated the principle that a reviewing court cannot substi-
tute its judgment for that of the administrative decisionmaker in matters that involve the
credibility of witnesses. 304 N.W.2d at 898.
Minnesota courts have consistently required agency decisions to be supported by sub-
stantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. See, e.g., Urban Council on
Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 1980)
(substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion" and absent manifest injustice inferences drawn from evidence by
agency must be accepted by reviewing court even though it appears contrary inferences
would be better supported), noted in 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 221 (1981); Hennepin
County Court Employees Group v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 274 N.W.2d 492,
494 (Minn. 1979) (substantial evidence standard need not be restricted by deference his-
torically extended to agency decisions if subject matter "is specifically within the court's
particularized experience and expertise"); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808,
822-23 (Minn. 1977) (substantial evidence is appropriate standard unless lower court is
required by statute to grant trial de novo); St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Min-
nesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 312 Minn. 250, 259-60, 251 N.W.2d 350, 356-57 (1977) (when
administrative agency acts in judicial capacity its decisions will be reviewed on substantial
evidence standard; when agency acts in legislative capacity its decisions will be upheld
unless shown to be in excess of statutory authority or shown to be unjust, unreasonable or
discriminatory by clear and convincing evidence); Quinn Distrib. Co. v. Quast Transfer,
Inc., 288 Minn. 442, 448, 181 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1970) (substantial evidence test and not
"any-evidence" test controls scope of review of findings of fact by Public Service Commis-
sion); Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 288 Minn.
294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970). In Minneapoh Van the court commented on the substantial
evidence test:
'the statutory rule also settles any doubt of our conformity with the major-
ity of courts, both state and Federal, in accepting the substantial-evidence rule as
the rule governing the scope of all judicial review of evidence supporting factual
findings of administrative agencies. . . . [S]ubstantial evidence is more than "a
scintilla" and is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." . . . While the test is "vague, rather than
precise" and the "intensity of review" may vary from case to case, "the test is the
same as the test on review of a jury verdict, but the review is narrower than the
review of the findings of a judge sitting without a jury," the latter being gov-
erned by the "clearly erroneous" test. The burden is upon the appellant to es-
tablish that the findings of the commission are not supported by the evidence in
the record, considered in its entirety. If the evidence is conflicting or the undis-
puted facts permit more than one inference to be drawn, the findings of the
commission may not be upset and the district court may not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the commission.
Id. at 298-99, 180 N.W.2d at 177-78 (footnote, citations omitted); see also City of St. Paul v.
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 436 F. Supp. 628 (D. Minn. 1977) (Minnesota law requires
application of substantial evidence test after removal to federal court); Ekstedt v. Village
[Vol. 8
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Under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act,4 an agency must
come to an independent decision5 on the basis of the evidence presented
to and the findings of the hearing examiner.6 Since the legisIture in-
of New Hope, 292 Minn. 152, 193 N.W.2d 821 (1972) (applying substantial evidence test
to village personnel board's discharge of police officers after district court erred in revers-
ing agency decision); Jackson v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 277 Minn. 293, 152 N.W.2d 472
(1967) (substantial evidence test required in review of determination of application for
proposed bank by state Commerce Commission).
Minnesota courts traditionally defer to factual findings of administrative agencies
and do not substitute their own findings on review. This principle is embodied in the
substantial evidence test. Like any trier of fact, the agency hears the evidence, observes
the demeanor of the witnesses, and has the presumptive expertise to make an informed
decision. See Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co.,
288 Minn. 294, 299, 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (1970); Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd., 285 Minn.
123, 126, 171 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1969); see also Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808 (Minn. 1977) (substitution by trial court of its own decision held inappropriate); First
Nat'l Bank v. Department of Commerce, 310 Minn. 127, 134, 245 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1976)
(appeal based on failure of agency to demonstrate reasonable public demand for new
bank rejected because argument speaks to matter particularly within province of agency).
In Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope, 292 Minn. 152, 193 N.W.2d 821 (1972), the vil-
lage personnel board discharged police officers and the district court reversed. The
supreme court affirmed a finding that resolutions that officers presented to their superior
officer criticizing the administration of the police department and recommending psychi-
atric evaluation of one of their superiors were grievances within a statute providing that
public employees may not be discharged because of participation in the submission of a
grievance. The court noted the general rule that a reviewing court is not justified in inter-
fering with the decision of the administrative agency, and that the court should not substi-
tute its findings of fact for those of the agency. The court, however, pointed out that its
findings as to matters of law are binding upon the agency:
[T]he court's decision on matters of law is binding upon the agency, and it can,
by writ of mandamus, compel performance of a judicially determined
mandatory duty rather than remand to the agency for further proceedings ac-
cording to law.
Id. at 164, 193 N.W.2d at 829.
4. MINN. STAT. ch. 14 (1982). The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act first
took shape in 1945. See Act of Apr. 21, 1945, ch. 452, 1945 Minn. Laws 869-71. Entitled
"An act to prescribe uniform rules of practice for adminstrative agencies," it defined
"agency" in very broad terms and dealt only with rules and regulations. Id. § 1(2), 1945
Minn. Laws at 869 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 14.02(2) (1982)). Contested cases
were not included. Later, the definition of agency was amended to include only those
agencies with statewide jurisdiction and contested cases were included within the purview
of the act. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 806, 1957 Minn. Laws 1101.
5. MINN. STAT. § 14.61 (1982) (final decision in contested cases must be rendered by
officials of agency after report of hearing examiner); see People for Environmental Enlight-
enment and Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environment Quality Council, 266
N.W.2d 858, 873 (Minn. 1978).
6. The Office of Hearing Examiners was created by Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380,
1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1293 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 14.48-.56 (1982)). Among the
hearings conducted by the examiners are cases from agencies required by the statute to
utilize the office. See MINN. STAT. §§ 14.02(2), .50 (1982).
The Office of Hearing Examiners acts as an independent third party in the adminis-
trative process. Its legislative purpose is to insure full and fair public participation in both
the rulemaking and the contested case process. It operates on a revolving fund by billing
19821
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tended agency members to consider the material presented to them prior
to reaching their decision, 7 the opportunity for discovery of the agency's
decision-making process is important. Without discovery parties would
be practically precluded from determining whether the agency simply
each agency for the cost of services rendered on its behalf. Examiners include specialists in
transportation, environmental, and regulatory matters. See Harves, Independent Hearing Ex-
aminers- The Minnesota Experience, HENNEPIN LAW., May-June 1980, at 6, 8. The office has
no statutory authority to compel agencies to submit cases for hearing before it. Therefore,
an attorney who is representing a client who requires agency action must initiate the hear-
ing process by following the appropriate statutory procedure under which the agency op-
erates. The agency must then contact the office for assignment of a hearing examiner. If
in reviewing the appropriate statutes the attorney can find no provision for a hearing, he
should check the agency's rules. Sometimes agencies provide for hearings in their rules
when none exists in the statute. If no provision for a hearing exists in those sources, one
must rely upon a constitutional source. For an excellent discussion of how the Minnesota
Office of Hearing Examiners operates under the Minnesota APA, see ADVANCED LEGAL
EDUCATION, CURRENT STATUS OF THE MINNESOTA ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
(1980); STATE BAR ASS'N CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PROCESS IN MINNESOTA (1976). See generally Harves, supra.
7. People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v.
Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 873 (Minn. 1978).
PEER involved review of a construction permit issued by the Minnesota Environ-
mental Quality Council (MEQC) for the construction of a high voltage transmission line.
The court noted, "Under the APA the agency must review the evidence and findings
amassed by the hearing examiner and come to an independent decision. Thus, the legisla-
ture clearly intended agency members to read the material presented to it prior to reach-
ing their decision." 266 N.W.2d at 873.
PEER is important for two additional reasons. First, appellants alleged that not all of
the members of the MEQC were familiar with the transcript and other documents per-
taining to the public hearings on the route selection. Id. at 872. The district court held
that it was rnot necessary to investigate the individual mental processes of the members of
the MEQC because its findings were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 872-73.
The supreme court concluded that the findings were not sufficiently specific to permit
judicial review. Id. It pointed out that generally the MEQC's refusal to answer PEER's
interrogatories and admissions as privileged material under Morgan IV would be appropri-
ate. Id. at 873. However, the court reaffirmed its holding in Mampel v. Eastern Heights
State Bank, 254 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. 1977), that allows persons seeking judicial review
of agency decisionmaking to make inquiry through discovery to determine whether the
agency adhered to statutorily defined procedures or rules and regulations promulgated by
the agency itself which enter into the fundamental decision-making process. "In order to
insure that the statutory scheme is not thwarted and that the validity of administrative
decisionmaking does not become suspect, it is necessary to permit limited discovery when
a statute requires specified persons to make decision." PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 873.
The court also stated:
We must emphasize, however, that the discovery we sanction is limited to infor-
mation concerning the procedural steps that may be required by law and does not
extend to inquiries into the mental processes of an administrator which, being
part of the judgmental process, are not discoverable under United States v. Morgan
[Morgan IV]. It should be clear that this rule would similarly protect from dis-
covery the process of judicial decisionmaking which is judgmental rather than
procedural in nature.
Id. (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the PEER decision with analysis of judicial
review of institutional decisionmaking, see 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 221, 228-31 (1981).
[Vol. 8
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accepted the findings of the hearing examiner without exercising in-
dependent judgment, or whether the agency independently examined
the evidence in reaching a conclusion.8
In re Lecy involved an application for a bank charter.9 A hearing ex-
8. See Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank, 254 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. 1977).
Mampel involved an application for a bank charter which was granted by the Banking
Commission. Objectors sought judicial review in district court. They sought to take depo-
sitions of the hearing examiner and three commissioners. They also served a wide-ranging
subpoena duces tecum upon the commissioners. The commissioners sought to quash the
subpoena and obtain a protective order against the taking of depositions. Id. at 377.
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, respondents argued that discovery was neces-
sary to determine whether the commissioners had heard or read the evidence notwith-
standing the statement in the agency's findings that it had considered all the evidence. Id.
at 377-78. The Minnesota court stated, "Discovery of the mental processes by which an
administrative decision is made generally is not proper." Id. at 378. However:
This is not to say that discovery is absolutely prohibited in proceedings for judi-
cial review of agency decisions. Discovery may be permitted by the district court
upon procedural matters if the discovery is appropriately limited. Persons seek-
ing review may make inquiry through discovery to determine whether the
agency adhered to statutorily defined procedures or the rules and regulations
promulgated by the agency itself which enter into the fundamental decision-
making process.
Id. The court discerned the intent of the legislature to allow a narrow scope of review in
such cases. To further this policy the court laid out the proper procedure for such
discovery:
Because of the narrow scope of discovery presently permitted, we have con-
cluded that the most appropriate method by which such discovery should be
accomplished is through depositions of witnesses upon written questions as al-
lowed under Rule 31, Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, because of the lim-
ited scope of discovery, in the absence of agreement by counsel, we direct that
the deposition questions be presented to the trial court for approval before their
submission to the witnesses. Such a policy will minimize the burden for public
officials called upon to answer such interrogation, but will insure meaningful
review to persons aggrieved by administrative action by allowing them to in-
quire into those procedures which comprise the fundamental decision-making
process.
Id.
9. 304 N.W.2d 894, 895;see MINN. STAT. § 45.04 (1982). A prerequisite to operating
a bank in Minnesota is the application for a bank charter. The incorporators of any
proposed bank must execute an application in writing, file it with the Department of
Commerce, and pay a filing fee of $1,000. An additional $500 must also be paid to the
Commissioner of Banks for its investigation of the application. Within 60 days of the
filing of the application a hearing is held to decide if the application will be granted.
Notice is published and the Commerce Commission is required to listen to the applicants
and all other witnesses who may appear in favor of or against the granting of the applica-
tion. If the Commission decides in favor of the application it must file its order within 90
days of the hearing. This order directs the Commissioner of Banks to issue the certificate
of authorization as provided by law. If the application is denied, a similar order is filed
with the Commissioner of Banks notifying it of the application's disapproval. Notice of
denial is then given to the proposed incorporators.
Litigation involving bank charters has been a colorful part of Minnesota case law. In
fact, without it, administrative case law may not have developed to the extent it has in
Minnesota. See, e.g., Suburban Nat'l Bank v. Department of Commerce, 260 N.W.2d 291
(Minn. 1977); Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank, 254 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1977);
19821
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aminer listened to the testimony of expert witnesses and considered sev-
eral economic studies.' 0 Later, the Commerce Commission met to
consider written and oral arguments and to consider the hearing exam-
iner's proposed findings of fact.I Two of the commissioners read the
entire record. A third read approximately one-half.12 There was no dis-
cussion between the commissioners and approval of the application took
about two minutes.
13
The parties objecting to the agency decision sought review in Ramsey
County District Court.i4 The trial court rejected all but one of their
procedural and substantive claims, finding that the commission had se-
First Nat'l Bank v. Department of Commerce, 310 Minn. 127, 245 N.W.2d 861 (1976);
Bryan v. Community State Bank, 285 Minn. 226, 172 N.W.2d 771 (1969); Jackson v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 277 Minn. 293, 152 N.W.2d 472 (1967); State ex rel. Dybal v. State Sec.
Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920).
10. 304 N.W.2d 894, 896. The major focus at the hearing was the statutorily imposed
criteria of reasonable public demand for the bank and whether the probable volume of
business in the location was sufficient to insure and maintain the solvency of the new bank
and the solvency of the then existing bank or banks in the locality. See MINN. STAT.
§ 45.07 (1982). At the hearing, respondents introduced an economic feasibility study.
This study analyzed the market area and contained a household survey. The study estab-
lished the trade area for the new bank as consisting of an eight township area.
11. Id. at 896. The hearing examiner's findings did not include conclusions of law or
a decision to grant the charter because pre-1976 law did not authorize him to make a
recommended decision. See MINN. STAT. § 45.032 (1982) (prior to creation of Office of
Administrative Hearings all hearings of Commerce Department were conducted inter-
nally and hearing examiner was limited to making findings of fact);see also id. §§ 14.48-.56
(provisions governing Office of Administrative Hearings).
12. See 304 N.W.2d at 898. The presence of two commissioners meets quorum re-
quiremets. MINN. STAT. § 45.02 (1982). The decision for approval was two to none. The
two commissioners who voted considered the entire record before making the decision.
304 N.W.2d at 896-97. Their actions were consistent with the requirement of Urban
Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729 (Minn.
1980). Urban Council requires the majority of the agency decisionmakers to review the
entire record and read verbatim only those areas of testimony that are of substance or in
dispute. Id. at 736. For an analysis of the PEER-Urban Council controversy over whether
the agency decisionmakers must read the entire record, see 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 221
(1981). Under Urban Council, a commissioner's failure to review the entire record would
violate the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. See MINN. STAT. § 14.61 (1982).
The fact that one of the commissioners in this case read one-half the record is irrelevant
because those decisionmakers who rendered the decision had read the entire record. Brief
for Respondent-Commerce Commission at 10, In re Lecy, 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981).
13. 304 N.W.2d at 897.
14. Id. Review was sought pursuant to statute. See MINN. STAT. §§ 14.63-.69,
45.032(2) (1982). Section 14.63 allows "any person aggrieved by a final decision in a con-
tested case" to seek judicial review. A petition must be filed by the aggrieved person not
more than 30 days after the party receives the final decision and order of the agency. Id.
§ 14.63. Section 14.69 outlines the scope ofjudicial review for a contested case. It permits
the district court to affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further pro-
ceedings. The district court
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceed-
ings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the
[Vol. 8
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lected the incorrect trade area for the new bank. 15
Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Appellants
argued that the commissioners should be required to hold collegial dis-
cussions on each of appellant's objections, or, in the alternative, to discuss
petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as sub-
mitted; or
(0 Arbitrary or capricious.
Id. § 14.69. Section 45.032(2) provides for review as otherwise provided by law.
The petition in Lecy alleged that both the Commission and the hearing examiner had
committed procedural and substantive errors in granting the application. Among the pro-
cedural errors alleged were that the Commission failed to decide the motions made by
appellants and that the hearing examiner failed to follow statutorily required procedures
by omitting conclusions of law and a proposed order from his report. 304 N.W.2d at 897.
The substantive errors alleged were that applicants did not establish a reasonable public
demand for the new bank; that the trade area determination was inaccurate; that the
population and economic statistics for the area did not justify another bank; that the
applicants failed to establish that the new bank would remain solvent and that existing
banks would not be adversely affected; and that the commission failed to comply with the
open meeting law. Id.
15. 304 N.W.2d at 897. Trade area is a term of art in banking. MINN. STAT. § 45.07
(1982) states:
[Ilf there is reasonable public demand for this bank in this location . . . [and] if
the probable volume of business in this location is sufficient to insure and main-
tain the solvency of the new bank and the solvency of the then existing bank or
banks in the locality without endangering the safety of any bank in the locality
as a place of deposit of public and private money, . . . the application shall be
granted otherwise it shall be denied.
This section is limited to the trade area requirements. The statute also imposes other
requirements upon applicants, such as good moral character and management guarantees.
Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has established factors to be used by the commission
in determining whether the reasonable public demand criteria have been satisfied.
(1) Number of banks already serving the area in which the proposed bank would
locate; (2) size of area; (3) population of area; (4) wealth of residents of area;
(5) commercial and industrial development of area; (6) potential growth of area;
(7) adequacy of the services being provided by existing banks compared to the
needs of residents and the services to be offered by proposed bank; (8) capability
of existing banks to handle potential growth of the area; (9) convenience of the
location of existing banks to residents of the area as compared to convenience of
the proposed bank; (10) size of banks in area; (11) dates when the banks in the
area were established; and (12) the number of persons in area who desire to use
the proposed bank and the amount of business they would generate.
Jackson v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 277 Minn. 293, 295, 152 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
In Lecy the trial court determined that the trade territory found by the Commission
was not supported by the evidence. 304 N.W.2d at 898. It went on to draw its own
conclusions as to deposits and solvency based on other evidence submitted by applicants.
Id. The supreme court held this to be error because "the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of expert witnesses 'is a matter particularly within the province of the . . .
hearing examiner.'" Id.; see supra note 3.
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those objections in a written memorandum.' 6 The supreme court re-
16. The Commerce Commission contended that the collegial discussion argument of
appellants was simply a thinly disguised attempt to convince the court to allow inquiry
into the thought processes of agency decisionmakers. Brief for Respondent-Commerce
Commission at 6-7, In re Lecy, 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981). The Commerce Commis-
sion also suggested in its brief that objectors to bank charter applications have an obvious
financial incentive to delay the application process. The more protracted this process be-
comes, the longer it forestalls the opening of business by their new competitor. Id. at 1.
Appellant, in its reply brief, objected to these suggestions by pointing out that it had
not asked for a stay from either the court or agency and that it had always acted in good
faith. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-2, In re Lecy, 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981); see also
MINN. STAT. § 14.65 (1982) (permits agency or reviewing court to stay proceedings upon
such terms as it deems proper).
Notwithstanding either parties' arguments, the case had been in litigation for almost
six years. The application process was started on September 19, 1975, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court finally decided the case on April 24, 1981. Delay has been a significant
factor.
Delay is a strategy which has been used successfully by many groups in the pursuit of
their objectives.
All minority groups have gone through a learning process. They have discovered
that it is relatively easy with our legal system and a little militancy to delay
anything for a very long period of time. To be able to delay a program is often
to be able to kill it. Legal and administrative costs rise, but the delays and un-
certainties are added to their calculations, both government and private industry
often find that it pays to cancel projects that would otherwise be profitable.
Costs are simply higher than benefits. In one major environmental group, delays
are such a major part of their strategy that they have a name for it, analysis
paralysis. . . . The result is an adversary situation where the developer cannot
get his project underway and where the environmentalists also cannot get ex-
isting plants such as Reserve Mining to clean up their current pollution. Where
it helps them, both sides have learned the fine art of delay.
L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 13 (1980).
Even though delay is a powerful tactic which has been used by various groups very
successfully, an attorney is subject to discipline for taking an action on a client's behalf
solely for delay. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1); see also
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft Jan. 30, 1980), § 3.3
(Kutak). The Kutak draft requires:
A lawyer shall make every effort consistent with the legitimate interests of the
client to expedite litigation. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client. A lawyer
shall not engage in any procedure or tactic having no substantial purpose other
than delay or increasing the cost of litigation to another party.
Id. In the official comment, the report outlined the policy considerations.
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay
should not be indulged for the convenience of the advocates, nor for the purpose
of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It
is not enough that a lawyer's procedural act, or refusal to act, is in personal good
faith, or that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The ques-
tion is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the act or
refusal to act as having some substantial purpose other than delay.
Id. MINN. R. Civ. P. 11 provides that the signature of an attorney on a pleading consti-
tutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. See Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976)
(petition for review of Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying motion to reopen
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jected these arguments stating, "[N]othing in the statutory requirement
applicable to the Commission requires a collegial discussion between the
commissioners prior to a final decision .... 17 To require the commis-
sioners to orally discuss in public a decision on which they have reached
an independent judgment just for the sake of form is absurd." 8
The court considered the extent to which mental processes of adminis-
trative decisionmakers may be discovered.19 Since 1939 Minnesota
courts have followed the general prohibition of United States v. Morgan
(Morgan ZV)20 which held that mental processes of administrative deci-
sionmakers may not be probed. 2 t The court in Morgan IV reasoned that
deportation hearing to apply for suspension of deportation was so utterly frivolous and
completely lacking in any merit that it permitted conclusion that it was interposed solely
as delaying tactic by counsel and double costs taxed personally against counsel); see also In
re Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 383 N.E.2d 36 (1978) (attorney disbarred for professional
responsibility violations including undignified or discourteous conduct before tribunal;
judge told attorney he would impose sanction for counsel's delaying tactic and attorney
told judge on record it was "bunk" and he would "waltz" judge to Disciplinary Commis-
sion if sanction were allowed to stand).
17. 304 N.W.2d at 899. None of the relevant statutes impose collegial discussion re-
quirements upon agency decisionmakers. MINN. STAT. ch. 14 (1982) delineates the proce-
dural requirements for agency decisionmaking and contains no mention of such
discussion. The statutes require only a written statement of the reasons for an agency's
decision.
Every decision and order rendered by an agency in a contested case shall be in
writing, shall be based on the record and shall include the agency's finding of
fact and conclusions on all material issues.
MINN. STAT. § 14.62(1) (1982). Appellant argued that MINN. STAT. § 45.04(2) (1982)
requires the Commission to "decide" whether charters should be granted or denied. See
Brief for Appellant at 10-Il, In re Lecy, 304 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1981). There is no re-
quirement in the statute, however, that agency decisionmakers think out loud and verbal-
ize in public that process as opposed to merely weighing the pros and cons separately in
their own minds, independent of the other commissioners. 304 N.W.2d at 899.
18. 304 N.W.2d at 899. The Lecy court did not decide in Lecy whether appellants'
argument was an attempt to inquire into the mental processes of the administrative deci-
sionmakers. Apparently, the court felt that since no such requirement was found in the
applicable statutes, it need go no further. The court, however, did outline what types of
inquiry into the mental process of administrative decisionmakers are appropriate. See bnfra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
19. 304 N.W.2d at 899-900.
20. 313 U.S. 409 (1941); see supra note 1.
21. As early as 1939, in State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W.
294 (1939), the court, in response to a contention that the findings of the agency were not
sufficiently specific, stated:
The zone of propriety between the extremes of mere conclusion and undue
particularity has never been accurately defined. It has been said that all of the
essential facts upon which the order is based must be found. On the other hand,
the Commission is not obligated to display the weight given by it to any part of
the evidence or to disclose the mental operations by which it reached its result.
A candid statement of the reasons and processes by which its findings are
reached would be of assistance to the reviewing court, yet the Commission is
under no compulsion to expose its methods.
Id. at 524, 284 N.W. 294, 301 (citations omitted). In Village of Farmington v. Minnesota
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to hold otherwise would be to undermine the integrity of the administra-
tor's role as a decisionmaker.22 Other state and federal courts have mod-
ified this rule under limited circumstances.23 For example, an
inadequate record, 24 bad faith,25 or improper behavior 26 may justify lim-
ited discovery of the substantive decision-making process.
Mun. Comm'n, 284 Minn. 125, 170 N.W.2d 197 (1969), the court characterized a conten-
tion that the trial court had erred in refusing to permit appellants to call commission
members as witnesses for the purpose of ascertaining the theory of law they had applied in
reaching an administrative decision as "clearly without merit." Id. at 138, 179 N.W.2d at
205; see also Peope for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v.
Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 872-73 (Minn. 1978);
Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank, 254 N.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Minn. 1977).
22. 313 U.S. at 422; see uzfra note 32.
23. See, e.g. , Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
In Overton Park the Secretary of Transportation's decision to route a six-lane highway
was unaccompanied by formal findings. The Court remanded to the district court and
required some explanation to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority and whether his action was justifiable under the applicable standard. 401 U.S.
at 420-21. The Court noted that when the record is inadequate a reviewing court may
require administrative officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explain-
ing their action. Where, however, there are administrative findings made at the same time
as the decision, there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before
such inquiry may be made. Id. at 420.
In Pitts the Court stated that if the agency fails to explain its decision, so that judicial
review is frustrated, the court may "obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or
testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove
necessary." 411 U.S. at 143; see also Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200 (4th
Cir. 1964). In Singer the labor relations board sought enforcement of a cease and desist
order for unfair labor practices. The defendant argued that the board improperly pre-
vented the admission of relevant testimony and denied it the right to interrogate the field
examiner for the board. NLRB asserted the mental process rule as the justification for its
refusing to allow the examiner's testimony. The court held that the mental process rule
was but one facet of the general presumption of regularlity which attaches to decisions of
administrative bodies. Thus, where a prima facie case of misconduct is shown, justice
requires that the mental process rule be held inapplicable. Id. at 208.
In Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965), a 'd sub noma.
Bank of Dearborn v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967), an action
was brought by a state bank challenging the validity of an approval of a national bank
branch by the Comptroller of Currency. The court concluded that the comptroller
abused his discretion in granting the charter and granted a permanent injunction. It held
that the mental process rule was inapplicable when a prima facie case of sham and subter-
fuge on the part of the agency decisionmakers was established. 244 F. Supp. at 403.
24. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Ten-
neco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299 (D. Del. 1979); supra note 23.
In Tenneco an oil company sought judicial review of Department of Energy (DOE)
orders which determined that the company had failed to comply with pricing regulations
and was not entitled to be exempted from those regulations. 475 F. Supp. at 300. The
company sought to compel discovery through interrogatories and a request to compel
production of documents. It argued that completion of the administrative record is an
exception to the mental process rule. DOE argued that this action sought to probe the
mental processes of the decisionmakers within the agency. The court agreed with the
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In Minnesota, approval of limited discovery first appeared in the 1977
company and required production of all information and documents necessary to com-
plete the administrative record, stating:
Tenneco correctly asserts that it is entitled to discover any materials neces-
sary to complete the administrative record. "Where there is to be a review on
the record, the parties seeking review and the Court have a right to a complete
administrative record and, when a showing is made that it may not be complete,
limited discovery is appropriate to resolve that question." The complete admin-
istrative record consists of all documents and materials that were directly or indi-
rectly considered by the decision-makers at the time the decisions were rendered.
In the present case, Tenneco has urged, and a review of the materials certified to
this Court would also suggest, that the certified administrative record may be
incomplete. The transmitted record contains primarily Tenneco's submissions to
the agency, along with the formal Decisions and Orders issued by FEA and
DOE. It strains the Court's imagination to assume that the administrative deci-
sion-makers reached their conclusions without reference to a variety of internal
memoranda, guidelines, directives, and manuals, and without considering how
arguments similar to Tenneco's were evaluated in prior decisions by the agency.
DOE may not unilaterally determine what shall constitute the administrative
record and thereby limit the scope of this Court's inquiry.
Id. at 317 (footnote, citations omitted).
25. See Schicke v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 417 (D. Conn. 1972), rev'd sub noam.
Schicke v. Romney, 474 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1973). In Schicke an action for declaratory relief
was brought to determine whether the approval by the United States of the withdrawal of
certain property acquired by a city under an open space land program for use as a park
was valid. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. It held
that the findings by the Secretary did not constitute a clear error of judgment. The court
noted that inquiry into the motives of agency decisionmakers is permissible if there is bad
faith. It concluded, however, that plaintiffs had not raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the Secretary acted in bad faith. 346 F. Supp. at 421. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed on the single ground that the administrative record was deficient. See
474 F.2d at 315. The appellate court supported the lower court's finding that no triable
issue of bad faith existed. Id. at 319.
26. In KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
dented, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976), a company petitioned the NLRB to review a decision of a
regional director who had conducted an ex parte investigation into the company's claims
of pro-union activity by its supervisory employees. The NLRB refused review finding the
petition lacked merit. When the company refused to bargain, an unfair labor practice
charge was filed. On review of the NLRB's unfair labor practice order, the company
sought to compel discovery of documents and agency memoranda. The court denied the
motion, except to determine participation by staff members in the NLRB's decision. The
court learned that the individual members whose votes were cast by the assistants never
considered the case and stated, "[O]nce there has been aprmafacie demonstration of im-
propriety the courts will inquire into the administrative process in order to insure that the
decision making was informed, unbiased and personal." Id. at 305.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Harris, 481 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. II1. 1979), a manufacturer
brought an action against the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the FDA had failed
to take final administrative action on the manufacturer's cyclamate food additive petition.
The manufacturer also sought to compel discovery. Since the agency had provided no
formal conclusive findings after six years, discovery concerning the decisions by officials
and the bases for denial or delay was granted by the court. Id. at 78. The court
concluded:
In view of the extended delay, plaintiff's supported contentions that non-techni-
cal factors have led to that delay and FDA's surprising assertion that considera-
1982]
11
et al.: Administrative Law—Discovery of Agency's Decision-making Process—
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
case of Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank. 27 In Mampel the court al-
lowed "[p]ersons seeking review [to] make inquiry through discovery to
determine whether the agency adhered to statutorily defined procedures
or the rules and regulations promulgated by the agency itself which enter
into the fundamental decision-making process."28
A year later, in People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibihity
(PEER), Inc. v. Mnnesota Environmental Quality Council,29 the court clari-
fied the scope of this "limited discovery." 30 Reaffirming the procedures
outlined in Mampel, the PEER court emphasized that discovery "is lim-
ited to information concerning the procedural steps that may be required by
law and does not extend to inquiries into the mental processes of an ad-
ministrator which, being part of the judgmental process, are not discov-
erable under United States v. Morgan ."31
Despite stated limitations, PEER and Mampel resurrected many of the
horrors that Morgan IV sought to prevent.32 Lecy brought these fears to
tion of such factors is desirable, the court believes there has been a sufficient
"demonstration of impropriety," "more than a colorable claim of procedural ir-
regularity." The resolution of those issues, which are relevant to the question of
what this court should do, if anything, is through the discovery proposed by
plaintiff. Accordingly, that discovery is allowed.
Id. (citations omitted); cf Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d 91,
123 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (petitioners' claim that improper behavior was established by show-
ing that final agency decision closely resembled proposed findings and conclusions submit-
ted by EPA staff failed to overcome presumption of regularity).
27. 254 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1977); see supra note 4.
28. 254 N.W.2d at 378.
29. 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978); see supra note 7.
30. 266 N.W.2d at 873.
31. Id. (emphasis in original); see supra note 1.
32. One of the practical considerations behind the mental process rule is the extensive
interrogation agency members were subjected to in the Morgan cases. Professor Feller pre-
dicted such abuses before Morgan II and Morgan IV clarified the mental process rules,
stating:
We may even witness the incredible spectacle of long trials in which administra-
tive officers are questioned at length on the amount of time which they spent in
reading the record and what their mental attitudes were. This actually hap-
pened in the Morgan case. When the case went back for trial to the lower court,
the plaintiffs submitted over a hundred interrogatories to the Secretary, and
elaborate depositions were taken. The Secretary was asked how much time he
had devoted to the testimony of each witness and to each exhibit, what weight he
had accorded to such testimony, what pages of the briefs he had read, what
theories of rate making he had considered and rejected, etc. If this sort of thing
is to be permitted, administrative adjudication will become an ineffectual farce.
Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647, 663
(1938) (footnote omitted).
Four considerations support the Morgan IV privilege against discovery of an adminis-
trator's mental processes. First, such an examination would consume a valuable adminis-
trative resource-the agency decisionmaker's time. See Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 39
F.R.D. 9, 10 (D.V.I. 1966). Harassment of the decisionmaker by disappointed parties is
also possible and must be guarded against. See NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, Inc., 106
F.2d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 1939). Second, examination of the factors that entered into the
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fruition. The administrative decisionmakers in Lecy were forced to an-
swer extensive interrogatories and to testify before the district court.
33
The supreme court expressed alarm over the inordinate amount of time
the case had spent in litigation 34 and felt a significant portion of the
delay was due to an inappropriate application of the limited discovery
rule of Mampel.35 Since the discovery went beyond the contemplated
limits of Mampel, the Minnesota court laid down strict standards for fu-
ture cases:
[W]ritten interrogatories may be submitted by an appellant within 30
days of the date of appeal directed to each commissioner. Such inter-
rogatories shall be limited to the following questions: (1) Did the com-
missioner adhere to all statutory and administrative procedural rules in
reaching his decision? (2) If the answer to question one is no, what
deviations took place? (3) Did the commissioner read the entire record
administrator's ultimate decision would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, be-
cause the exercise of judgment is a weighing process not susceptible to cross-examination.
See NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 229 (1949). Third, such examination
would lead to judicial usurpation of the administrator's role as a decisionmaker. See
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Morgan IV). Finally, the examination
would offend the agency decisionmaker and tend to undermine his or her sense of respon-
sibility. Id.
33. See 304 N.W.2d at 900. In November 1977, after engaging in various discovery
battles with the applicants, appellants served, pursuant to MINN. R. CIv. P. 31, interroga-
tories on all of the commissioners and the hearing examiner. The commissioners were
each asked 41 questions. The actual number was higher since many of the 41 were multi-
ple questions. The questions inquired into whether the commissioners had any off the
record communications with each other, with the hearing examiner, with the applicants,
or with any other Minnesota government officials or employees. They were asked whether
they had read all the evidence in the case, whether they had read every word of every line
on every page and, if not, asked to describe what they had read and what percentage of it
was read before, rather than after, oral argument. They were asked how many hours it
took them to read the evidence. They were asked whether they themselves were aware of
any procedural irregularity occurring in the proceedings. When the case was finally tried
in May 1978, appellants took testimony from and cross-examined each of the commission-
ers, the hearing examiner, and the executive secretary of the Commission during a two-
day trial reviewing the agency's order under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act.
See MINN. STAT. § 14.68 (1982). Many of the areas inquired into in discovery were again
inquired into at trial. Brief for Respondent-Commerce Commission at 3-5, In re Lecy, 304
N.W.2d 984 (Minn. 1981).
34. 304 N.W.2d at 899. Approximately five and one-half years had elapsed by the
time the case was decided by the supreme court. See supra note 16.
35. 304 N.W.2d at 900. In Mampel the court stated "Discovery may be permitted by
the district court upon procedural matters if the discovery is appropriately limited." 254
N.W.2d at 378. This standard permits a wide-ranging interpretation of good faith as to
the extent of permissible discovery. It is unclear what constitutes "appropriately limited"
discovery. The court also stated, "Included in this case would be limited and narrow
inquiry into whether there was compliance with Minn. St. 1974, § 15.0421 [recodified as
MINN. STAT. § 14.61 (1982)]." Id. Again, what "limited and narrow inquiry" encom-
passes is unclear. Obviously, the appellant in Lecy went beyond what the court intended
in Mampel. The Mampel court's lack of specificity, however, contributed to the problems
faced in Lecy.
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prior to rendering a decision? (4) Did the commissioner rely on infor-
mation outside of the record in making the decision? and (5) If the
answer to question to four is yes, what information outside of the rec-
ord was relied upon in making the decision? The commissioners shall
not be deposed, nor shall they be required to testify before the trial
court reviewing their decision.
36
These restrictive standards are significant for several reasons. First,
they overrule dicta in Mampel which permitted depositions to be taken of
administrative decisionmakers. 37 Second, they prohibit requiring the
decisionmaker to appear as a witness before a reviewing court.38 Third,
they incorporate dicta in PEER by limiting discovery to only the proce-
dural steps taken by the decisionmaker.39 Fourth, they allow parties to
inquire into whether the administrator read the entire record prior to
rendering a decision4 ° Finally, they eliminate the former requirement
that a party seeking discovery obtain prior approval of interrogatories
from the trial court.
41
Lecy is an important step forward in Minnesota administrative law. It
preserves the availability of limited discovery while protecting the integ-
rity of the administrative process. Parties retain the right to discover
whether administrative decisionmakers simply rubberstamped the find-
ings of the hearing examiner or made an independent decision. These
discovery limitations place Minnesota in line with the federal rule. Al-
36. 304 N.W.2d at 900.
37. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
38. Mampel permitted discovery through the use of depositions of witnesses as permit-
ted under MINN. R. Civ. P. 31. See 254 N.W.2d at 378. Rule 31 permits depositions of
witnesses upon written questions. MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01.
39. 304 N.W.2d at 900. In PEER the court defined procedural matters to include
"whether the agency adhered to statutorily defined procedures or the rules and regulations
promulgated by the agency itself which enter into the fundamental decision-making pro-
cess." 266 N.W.2d at 873 (quoting Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank, 254 N.W.2d
375, 378) (Minn. 1977)).
40. 304 N.W.2d at 900. It is unclear what the impact of a negative answer to the
interrogatory is. See supra note 12; 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 221 (1981).
41. Mampel required the use of depositions under MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01. The depo-
sition questions, in the absence of agreement by counsel, were required to be presented to
the trial court for approval before their submission to the witnesses. 254 N.W.2d at 378.
The Ley court appears to reject the use of depositions of witnesses upon written questions.
See 304 N.W.2d at 900 ("The commissioners shall not be deposed.").
The decision also made reference to the use of interrogatories. Id. Interrogatories to
parties are controlled by MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01 (limits interrogatories to 50 and requires
answers within specified time periods). The court did not indicate whether interrogatories
in the absence of agreement by counsel are required to be submitted for approval by the
trial court prior to their submission to witnesses as they were in Mampel. Thus, it is un-
clear under Leg whether interrogatories may be sent directly to the witnesses or first to the
trial court for approval. From the language the court used, "Following a decision of the
Commerce Commission, written interrogatories may be submitted by an appellant within
thirty days of the date of appeal directed to each Commissioner," 304 N.W.2d at 900, a
strong inference can be made that prior approval is no longer required.
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lowing administrators to concentrate on policymaking and supervisory
functions, rather than participation in protracted discovery and litiga-
tion, should improve the efficiency of the administrative system in
Minnesota.
Constitutional Law--CHURCH PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIoN-Ideal Life
Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
Religious organizations have long enjoyed a variety of exemptions
from property and income taxes.' Tax exemptions for church property
date from colonial times in the United States and from as far back as the
third century in Europe. 2 Church property tax exemptions in this coun-
try have traditionally rested on statutory or constitutional provisions. 3 A
1. Religious tax exemptions pre-date the Revolutionary War. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970). Federal income taxation has always exempted
religious organizations. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556; Act of
Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172; I.R.C. §§ 501-515 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See Paulsen, Preferment of Rehgious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 147-48 (1949); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 461-62 (1959); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of Amertan Church Property, 14
MICH. L. REV. 646, 647-50 (1916).
3. See, e.g., Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir.
1966); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 648, 298 P.2d 1, 4 (1956).
Minnesota's church property exemption is statutory. See MINN. STAT. § 272.02
(1982). The church property tax exemptions of Florida, Mair.e and Michigan are similar
to Minnesota's. See FLA. STAT. § 196.191 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652
(1978); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 211.7 (1967).
Examples of statutes requiring only ownership by religious organizations include
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103
(1975); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(3) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982).
Use-based statutes are classified further as to type of use. See Ky. CONST. § 170
("places actually used for religious worship"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5020-204 (Purdon
Supp. 1983) ("actual places of regularly stated religious worship"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3802 (1981).
Some exemptions focus on the nature of the use, e.g., primarily or exclusively reli-
gious or non-profit. See ALA. CODE § 40-9-1 (Supp. 1982) (exclusive); ALASKA CONST. art.
9, § 4 (exclusive, non-profit); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271 (Supp. 1982) (non-profit);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-206 (1980) (exclusive); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-101(e) (1973)
(primary); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002(13) (1981) (same); GA. CONST. § 2-4604 (non-
profit); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-32(b)(3) (1976) (same); IDAHO CODE § 63-105B (1976)
(exclusive); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (exclusive, non-
profit); IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1.9 (West Supp. 1983) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(Supp. 1982) (same); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 21(b)(l) (exclusive, non-profit); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 9(c) (1975) (exclusive); Mo. REV. STAT. § 137.100 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (exclu-
sive, non-profit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West Supp. 1983) (exclusive); N.M. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3 (non-profit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(7) (Supp. 1981) (exclusive); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980) (exclusive, non-profit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68
§ 24 05(g) (West 1966) (exclusive); OR. REV. STAT. § 307.140 (1981) (same); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 44-3-3 (Supp. 1982) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-9 (1982) (same);
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (Vernon 1982) (primary, non-profit); UTAH CODE ANN.
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